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Abstract 
Phasing out energy subsidies may increase the price of energy and adversely affect the poor. 
However, the households may benefit from the redistribution of the revenue from this policy 
in the economy. Here, we investigate the impacts of phasing out energy subsidies and direct 
transfer of the policy revenue to households. Employing a Computable General Equilibrium 
model, we measure the impacts on labor-leisure choice and on labor supply. Considering the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index and the Food Ratio Method, we construct several poverty 
indices: the Gini index, the ratio of none-food expenditures to food expenditure, the ratio of 
income of the richest decile to the poorest decile, and the ratio of income of the two richest 
deciles to the two poorest deciles. We analyze the effects of an increase in energy prices and 
direct transfer of revenues to the households in the Iranian economy. The findings suggest a 
considerable improvement in income distribution and a significant improvement in food to 
non-food ratio. The results also show an improvement in rural-urban income distribution.  
 








Several studies employ different approaches to evaluate the benefits from phasing out these subsidies in 
various countries (Araghi and Barkhordari, 2012; Aydın, 2016; Burniaux and Chateau, 2014; Dartanto, 2013; 
Dennis, 2016; Mirshojaeian Hosseini et al., 2015; Ouyang and Lin, 2014; Rentschler, 2016; Roos and Adams, 
2019; Shahmoradi and Honarvar, 2008; Solaymani and Kari, 2014; Wang et al., 2016; Wesseh Jr et al., 2016). 
This study will focus on income distribution. 
 Since 2010, the government decided to remove fossil fuel subsidies and pay the revenue to the 
households in direct cash transfers. The goal of this policy was to replace energy subsidies with targeted 
cash payments. One of the most important goals was to achieve a more equitable distribution of income 
and to reduce poverty. It was expected that the cash subsidy will be more effective for the poor. This paper 
will numerically evaluate the impacts on income distribution and poverty. The poor may have higher 
purchasing power from cash transfers, while the rich may face a reduction in real income. However, the 
overall impacts on income are not clear without numerical calculations.  
The policy affects income distribution and poverty through several channels. On one hand, cutting 
subsidies may increase the effective price of commodities and may reduce the purchasing power of the 
households. On the other hand, cash subsidy payment may raise nominal income but may reduce the supply 
of labor. The basis of this theory is the labor-leisure choice model. According to this model, individuals 
must make two key labor supply decisions; whether to work (participate in the labor market); and how 
much to work. Each individual maximizes a utility function subject to an income budget constraint (labor 
and non-labor income). Examples of non-labor income are an inheritance, a lottery prize, investment 
income, or a government transfer payment such as cash subsidy. Suppose that an individual obtains a new 
source of non-labor income; for example, cash subsidy in our study. It would cause the income budget to 
shift. In this case, the individual chooses to be at a higher level of utility, more leisure time and a decrease 
in labor supply. So, a key theoretical prediction is that the supply of labor may decrease when non-labor 
income increases (Mulligan, 2002). However, as the prices may increase due to the energy policy, the real 
income may change.  
This study employs a computable general equilibrium model (CGE) to quantify the impacts. Employing 
a Computable General Equilibrium model, we measure the impacts on labor-leisure choice and labor 
supply. Considering the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index and the Food Ratio Method, we construct several 
poverty indices: the Gini index, the ratio of none-food expenditures to food expenditure, the ratio of 
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income of the richest decile to the poorest decile, and the ratio of income of the two richest deciles to the 
two poorest deciles. We analyze the effects of an increase in energy prices and direct transfer of policy 
revenues to the households in the Iranian economy.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section introduces the method and presents 
the algebraic features of the model and the data used. Section three presents the results. Section four 
provides discussions and limitations. And section five concludes. 
METHODS 
There are several related studies based on CGE modeling in Iran  (Farajzadeh and Bakhshoodeh, 2015; 
Gahvari and Taheripour, 2011; Gharibnavaz and Waschik, 2015; Jafari et al., 2014; Jensen and Tarr, 2003; 
Karami et al., 2012; Manzoor et al., 2012, 2010; Shahnoushi et al., 2012). The core part of our model is 
developed in a team of economists and is employed for a wide range of analysis. The model considers 
interactions between different activities, households, and agents through numerous markets of goods, 
services, and factors of production (Manzoor et al., 2009, 2010; Shahmoradi et al., 2011; Manzoor et al., 
2012). For income distribution, we consider 10 income deciles for each urban and rural households (Haqiqi 
and Mortazavi Kakhaki, 2012; Mortazavi Kakhaki et al., 2013; Haqiqi et al., 2014, 2017b). Regarding capital 
input, we assume a sector-specific capital as well as a mobile capital (Manzoor et al., 2013; Haqiqi et al., 
2013b; Haqiqi and Mirian, 2015). As fossil fuel sector has significant role in the Iranian economy, we 
considered the revenue of fossil fuel resources and its flow in the economy (Haqiqi et al., 2013a; Manzoor 
and Haqiqi, 2012). We also considered the interconnections to international markets via exports and 
imports (Haqiqi and Bahador, 2015; Haqiqi and Bahalou Horeh, 2013). We also considered sectoral energy 
demand as well as sectoral production support by the government (Manzoor et al., 2011; Manzoor and 
Haqiqi, 2013; Haqiqi et al., 2017a). For labor supply we consider a leisure-labor optimization problem by 
income level (Haqiqi and Bahalou, 2015; Bahalou and Haqiqi, 2016). Each household has an initial 
endowment of labor. Households’ utility optimization determines the demand for each commodity and 
supply of labor. Here we only describe the labor-leisure choice of the model. The optimal of consumption 
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where U is utility of h household, C is consumption of goods and services, Z is leisure, TE is the index of 
household’s time endowment, L is labor, r is the rate of return of capital, K shows the capital stock of 
households, ω is the share parameter, w is wage of labor force, and s is saving rate. The optimum labor 
supply and leisure time will be: 
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We construct various poverty indicators based on FGT (Foster et al., 2010, 1984) with an α parameter. The 
higher the value of α, the greater the weight on the poorest individuals. An increase in the FGT statistic, 
means more poverty is in an economy. In this study, we've applied decile information instead of individuals 
to construct the index. The income of each urban and rural decile separately is derived from the model 
solutions of this study. To calculate FGT indices, we need poverty line information. In this study, we use 
the absolute poverty that is measured based on the subsistence costs method. We use the data of the 
Statistical Center of Iran based on the daily minimum caloric requirement of each person. For non-food 
costs, we use the Angel method. (Table 1)  
Table 1: Poverty line estimation for urban and rural annual income in 2010 in US dollar 
# People in Household 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Urban 2642 4428 5487 6339 7028 7534 8920 




According to the average of household’s size which is reported by the Statistical Center of Iran and table 1, 
we calculated a poverty line for urban and rural households in 2010. Then we used the "the share of current 
cost" for calculating the poverty lines for 2004 (the benchmark for the data base). It means, we divided 
"poverty line of 2010" by "annual cost of households in 2010” to calculate the 2004 poverty line. Then we 
multiply this share by the income of deciles. At last, we calculated the poverty line in 2010 for urban 
household $6,404 and for rural $2,029. With α = 0, the formula of FGT indices reduces to the headcount 
ratio. It shows the fraction of the population of the economy that lives below the poverty line. With α = 1, 
the formula indicates the poverty gap index which estimates the depth of poverty by considering how far 
the poor are from that poverty line. We also use α = 2 version, which is the lowest parameter to weigh 
income inequality along with poverty. We also consider other metrics including the income ratio of the 
richest decile to the poorest decile, the ratio of none-food expenditures to food expenditures, and the Gini 
Index. 
Data 
The model is calibrated based on the 2004 Micro Consistent Matrix (MCM) of the Iranian economy. 
This matrix is a rectangular form of Social Accounting Matrix which includes 56 commodities and 
production sectors, rural and urban households by income deciles.  
Policy scenario  
In this study, we use the proposed scenario of an increase in the energy prices and payment of cash subsidies 
in the Iranian economy. We assume that energy prices have changed according to table 2. The prices on 
table 2 are according to the first phase of the Iranian fossil fuel pricing reform in 2010.   
Table 1: Increase in Energy Prices in 2010 (USD) 
 Old Price New Price Change Percentage 
Electricity 0.159 0.393 148% 
Gas (Pipe) 0.109 0.578 432% 
Gasoline 0.962 3.846 300% 
Kerosene 0.159 0.962 506% 
Gas oils 0.159 1.442 809% 
Fuel oils 0.091 1.923 2005% 
Liquid gas (LPG) 0.028 1.923 6797% 
 
Some calculations are required for scaling cash subsidies to use them in our model. For calculating each 
deciles cash subsidy, we use the annual cost of each decile. In other words, we’ve included subsidy as "the 
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share of current cost" in the calculations. In the policy, all households were given a monthly cash transfer 
of about $44 per person as a subsidy. It means $528 is paid per person each year. Since the household size 
is different in rural and urban deciles, the amount of subsidy in each decile is calculated. The policy has 
been implemented in the middle of 2010. Therefore, Surveys of Household Expenditure and Income in 
2010 are biased by having part of the effects. Note that the Iranian calendar is different from the Western 
calendar, by having the first day of spring as the first day of the year. To separate the cost of energy shock, 
we assume the cost structure of households was like the 2009 structure. Then, this index is adjusted by the 
average inflation in the first 9 months in 2010 and the cost in 2010 is calculated without considering the 
policy (Table 3). In the end, we calculate the ratio of subsidy to cost per households in each decile. You will 
see these calculations on table 3 for urban deciles and on table 4 for rural deciles.  
 
Table 3: Inflation rates and partial adjustments 
Urban Rural  
71.89 285.15 Index of Inflation in Feb.2010 
81.59 324.13 Index of Inflation in Nov.2010 
88.83 390.52 Index of Inflation in Feb.2011 
13.49% 13.67% Inflation in nine months  
23.56% 36.95% Inflation in 12 months with considering the policy 
8.87% 20.48% Inflation in 22 Dec.2009 to 20 Mar.2010  
17.99% 18.22% *Inflation in 12 months without considering the policy 
Source: Authors calculations based on the Central Bank of Iran 
 
Table 4: The Ratio of cash subsidy to cost of each household for urban deciles 
The Ratio of cash subsidy in the 
expenditure of each household 
Households size Urban income 
deciles 
61% 2.79 1 
42% 3.53 2 
34% 3.73 3 
28% 3.71 4 
25% 3.87 5 
21% 3.90 6 
18% 4.08 7 
15% 4.05 8 
12% 4.06 9 
7% 4.11 10 
18% 3.78 Average 




Table 5: The Ratio of cash subsidy to cost of households for rural deciles  
The Ratio of cash subsidy in the 
expenditure of each household 
Households size Urban income 
deciles 
119% 2.57 1 
79% 3.41 2 
68% 3.98 3 
55% 4.08 4 
47% 4.23 5 
41% 4.41 6 
35% 4.60 7 
29% 4.73 8 
24% 4.99 9 
14% 5.37 10 
33% 4.24 Average 
Source: Authors calculations  
RESULTS 
The results suggest an improvement in all poverty indicators. The headcount ratio for urban poor 
households will remain constant. However, this ratio for the rural poor household is decreased from 0.40 
to 0.30. Also, the poverty gap in urban households decreases from 0.12 to 0.09, a 26.85% reduction. And 
in rural households, we see a 37.59% percent decreases. In other words, on average 26.85, percent of urban 
households and 37.59 percent of the rural households have become above the poverty line after the policy. 
In addition, FGT2 shows a 44.66 percent reduce (improvement) in poverty for urban deciles and it shows 
52.20 percent reduction for rural households.We find that the policy causes a decline in the purchasing 
power of the rich as expected, and a rise in the purchasing power of the poor. This is presented in table 6. 
Table 6: Percentage of changes in purchasing power after the policy 
urban rural Deciles 
-5.60% -7.10% 10 
-2.10% -5.40% 09 
0.00% -4.30% 08 
2.20% -3.20% 07 
4.90% -2.10% 06 
7.10% -0.40% 05 
10.70% 0.80% 04 
16.40% 3.00% 03 
21.10% 7.50% 02 
41.00% 17.10% 01 
Source: research findings 
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After implementing the policy, the purchasing power of two rich deciles (1&2) for rural households will 
decrease. Also, the purchasing power of six top deciles (rich) for urban households is declined, and the 
purchasing power of others will rise. The result reveals that the percentage of improvement in purchasing 
power for rural households is more than the percentage of improvement in purchasing power for urban 
households. 
We also report the changes in labor supply after phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. As shown in table 7, labor 
supply will decline with the highest decline for the poorest rural households (they face the highest rise in 
purchasing power). This is surprising but in line with the reports by the Statistical Center of Iran (2014).  
Table 7: Percent Change in labor supply for urban and rural households after the policy   
Rural Urban deciles 
-66.50% -35.30% 1 
-43.80% -24.30% 2 
-37.80% -19.50% 3 
-31.10% -16.70% 4 
-26.80% -15.20% 5 
-23.80% -13.20% 6 
-20.60% -11.80% 7 
-17.60% -10.20% 8 
-15.10% -8.80% 9 
-10.20% -6.20% 10 
Source: research findings 
Table 8 summarizes other metrics. The income ratio of the riches to the poorest decile is decreased in both 
rural and urban households. As shown in table 9 this decline in rural households is more than urban 
households. The ratio of none-food expenditures to food expenditures is increased (Increasing in this ratio 
probably means that the people become richer and because of that the ratio of food cost is falling in their 
basket). Usually, when this ratio is increasing, it shows an improvement in the welfare level. The Gini index 





Table 8: Indices of the income distribution 
Urban Rural Income Distribution Indices 
After Before After Before  
0.0361 0.0297 0.0283 0.0203 Share of 10% of the poor 
0.2801 0.2937 0.3039 0.3291 Share of 10% of the rich 
7.75 9.87 10.71 16.20 The richest decile to the poorest decile 
0.0735 0.0633 0.0637 0.0496 Share of 20% of the poor 
0.4471 0.4646 0.4710 0.5023 Share of 20% of the rich 
9.301 8.898 5.883 5.611 The ratio of non-food to food expenditure  
0.3774 0.4037 0.3922 0.4358 Gini Index 
  
The results for FGT is reported in table 9. According to the FGT index, poverty may improve when the 
ratio of food cost in total consumed the cost of household reduces. This index shows a slightly decrease in 
the ratio of food from 0.101 to 0.097 (with considering 3 decimal digits) for urban household and for rural 
households it also shows a slightly decrease from 0.151 to 0.145 (with considering 3 decimal digits).   
Table 9: Poverty Indices 









0.30 0.40 0.40 0.40 FGT(α=0) 
0.11 0.17 0.09 0.12 FGT(α=1) 
0.04 0.09 0.02 0.04 FGT(α=2) 
0.145 0.151 0.097 0.101 Angel theory   
 
DISCUSSION 
In this research, we find a possible decrease in labor supply after the policy. Without considering this 
change, the distributional analysis of the policy will be biased. Considering the impact on labor supply is 
one of the contributions of this study. Multi-sector approach and analysis of the direct and indirect effects 
of the policy are also the strengths of this research. However, each study has its own limitations. Here are 
the limitations of this study.  
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We employed income deciles in this study, a more precise approach would be the use of household surveys 
data. After the policy, some households may move up or down of the poverty line. Here we did not consider 
such dynamics.  
According to the results of this study, we realize that the policy has the potential to improve income 
distribution and poverty. Several factors may prevent it. Trade sanction and the way of financing the 
government budget deficit are an example of those factors. We didn’t consider the effects of the 
government’s budget deficit and trade sanctions. The way of financing of government budget deficit could 
affect the inflation and prices and it can change the purchasing power of households  
CONCLUSION 
We employ a CGE model with 56 commodities and production sectors as well as urban and rural 
households. We also considered a trade-off between consumption and leisure. The multi-sector approach 
of the CGE model and the rich details on goods and services help us to consider the effects of the policy 
on purchasing power and income distribution. Using this multi-sector, multi-household computable general 
equilibrium model, we analyze the impact of an energy price increase and direct cash subsidy transfer on 
purchasing power, labor supply, the demand of food, poverty indices and income distribution of urban and 
rural deciles in Iran. The results show that while the policy may reduce the supply of labor, it improves 
income distribution and poverty in Iran. Therefore, we found that this policy has the potential to improve 
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